Gutschmidt v. Maui Planning Commission and What It Means for Permit Applicants
Cades Schutte represented Goodfellow Bros., LLC in this matter.
On May 22, 2026, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gutschmidt v. Maui Planning Commission, SCOT-23-0000516 (the “Opinion”), a case in which Cades Schutte represented Goodfellow Bros., LLC. The Opinion affirmed the Maui Planning Commission’s decision to deny an untimely petition to intervene filed by neighbors in a special use permit proceeding.
The decision is unanimous, and, in our view, significant. It clarifies how agencies should evaluate “good cause” for late intervention petitions, rejects an effort to import a more lenient civil procedure standard into the land use context, and, perhaps most importantly, holds that a would-be intervenor that failed to follow the agency’s rules cannot later challenge the merits of the permit decision in court.
For developers, applicants, and anyone navigating contested case proceedings before Hawaiʻi land use agencies, Gutschmidt is a welcome reaffirmation that procedural deadlines matter.
The Project and the Permit
Goodfellow Bros., LLC applied to the Maui Planning Department in January 2021 for a special use permit to operate a temporary rock-crushing facility on approximately twelve acres of fallow agricultural land in Launiupoko, Maui. The site sits roughly a mile from the Makila Plantation neighborhood. The project was designed to produce aggregate for West Maui construction, diverting rock from the Central Maui Landfill and reducing truck traffic from Central and South Maui quarries.
Because the property is under fifteen acres and zoned agricultural, the application was processed by the Maui Planning Department and acted upon by the Maui Planning Commission. The public hearing was set for August 8, 2023, more than two and a half years after the application was filed.
Goodfellow engaged in extensive community outreach well beyond what the rules required. It held an informational Zoom meeting with the Makila Plantation Homeowners Association in September 2022. It mailed notice to all owners within 500 feet of the property on July 3, 2023. It published notice of the hearing in The Maui News on July 7, 2023, with the intervention deadline (July 25, 2023) printed in bold. And it held a second informational meeting with the homeowners association on August 3, 2023.
The Eleventh-Hour Petition
The Appellants were six residents or owners in the Makila Plantation neighborhood who did not file a petition to intervene by the July 25 deadline. Instead, they filed it at 1:06 p.m. on August 7, 2023, roughly twenty hours before the scheduled hearing. They acknowledged the petition was untimely but argued they had “good cause” because they had only recently learned of the application and had not had time to act.
The Commission disagreed. After taking testimony, recessing so that two commissioners could review the petition for the first time, and hearing from Goodfellow’s representative about the company’s outreach efforts, the Commission voted 6-0 to deny the petition. It then proceeded to approve the permit with conditions including a prohibition on coring, mining, or rock crushing on the property and a requirement that material be used for West Maui projects.
The Appellants appealed directly to the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court. The Court denied the appeal and upheld the Maui Planning Commission’s decision.
Four Takeaways From the Opinion
1. “Freely granted” does not apply to untimely petitions.
The Appellants leaned heavily on Rule 12-201-41(d) of the Maui Planning Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, which states that “Leave to intervene shall be freely granted.” They also pointed to Life of the Land, Inc. v. West Beach Development Corporation, 63 Haw. 529, 631 P.2d 588 (1981), which describes the legislative policy of HAPA and HRS Chapter 205 as one that “encourages broad public participation with intervention to be freely granted.”
The Court rejected the argument that this policy reaches untimely petitions stating, “for intervention to be freely granted, it must first be timely.” Opinion at 17. This is a clean answer to a recurring argument. The pro-participation policy embedded in HAPA and Chapter 205 does not override the agency’s procedural rules; it operates within them.
2. “Good cause” means a sufficient reason and the agency decides what that is
The most substantively interesting part of the opinion is the Court’s treatment of the “good cause” standard. The Appellants asked the Court to import the standard adopted in Chen v. Mah, 146 Hawaiʻi 157, 457 P.3d 796 (2020), for setting aside an entry of default in civil litigation. Under Chen, “good cause” exists unless the defaulting party engaged in “contumacious conduct,” defined as “willfully defiant” or “[w]illfully stubborn and disobedient conduct.”
The Court declined to extend that standard here. Instead, it adopted the simpler Black’s Law Dictionary definition consistent with its prior decisions in Doe v. Doe, 98 Hawaiʻi 144, 44 P.3d 1085 (2002), and Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, 146 Hawaiʻi 354, 463 P.3d 1011 (2020): “good cause” means “a sufficient reason, depending upon the circumstances of the individual case, and… a finding of its existence lies largely in the discretion of the court.”
The Court was explicit that “good cause” is context-dependent. The strict Chen standard reflects Hawai‘i’s strong policy favoring trial on the merits in civil litigation. That policy does not translate to the agency context where applications typically reflect years of staff work, notice, and community outreach by the time a hearing is convened. As the Court put it, “By the time the SUP application was ready for a public hearing, the applicant, the [Maui Planning Department], and the [Maui Planning Commission] were near the culmination of the decision-making process.” Opinion at 26.
The practical effect: agencies need not find good cause merely because a would-be intervenor’s tardiness was not willful. Negligence, miscommunication, or simply inattention to public notices may all fall short of “a sufficient reason.”
3. Agency discretion gets real weight
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the “good cause” inquiry “lies largely in the discretion of the officer or court to which the discretion is committed.” Opinion at 21. That language is not new but its application here is instructive. The Court reviewed the Commission’s reasoning – proper notice by publication, Goodfellow’s above-and-beyond outreach, the disruption caused to a six-member commission when two members had not even received the petition by the time the hearing began – and concluded that the Commission had not abused its discretion. Opinion at 27-28.
For applicants, this is encouraging. Reviewing courts will not second-guess an agency’s good cause determination as long as the agency engages in a reasoned inquiry into the circumstances.
4. If you don’t follow the rules, you don’t get to challenge the merits
Having affirmed the denial of the petition to intervene, the Court refused to reach the Appellants’ substantive challenges to the SUP approval. Quoting Kaleikini v. Thielen, 124 Hawaiʻi 1, 237 P.3d 1067 (2010), the Court reiterated the four requirements for judicial review of agency action and held that the Appellants failed the third: “the claimant must have followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, have been involved ‘in’ the contested case.” Opinion at 30.
This may be the most consequential part of the decision. It means that participation by submitting testimony is not enough. If the agency’s rules provide a mechanism for intervention and a would-be challenger fails to follow that mechanism, the courthouse door is closed.
Readers familiar with last year’s decision in Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. v. State, 156 Hawaiʻi 520, 575 P.3d 610 (2025), may notice some tension. In Maui Lani, the Court suggested that individuals who testified at a CUP hearing but did not intervene nonetheless had standing to appeal under HRS § 91-14(a), citing In re Hawaiian Electric Light Co., 145 Hawaiʻi 1, 445 P.3d 673 (2019) (“HECO”), and Mahuiki v. Planning Commission, 65 Haw. 506, 654 P.2d 874 (1982). Gutschmidt now makes clear that where agency rules provide for intervention, a party who declines to invoke them (or who tries and fails because of untimeliness) cannot bypass that procedure by appealing on the merits.
The earlier decisions are arguably distinguishable. In HECO, the appellant had sought intervention and been granted limited participation status. In Mahuiki, it was not clear that the agency’s rules even provided for intervention. Mahuiki relied on Jordan v. Hamada, where the appellant actually intervened, and Jordan in turn relied on East Diamond Head Ass’n v. ZBA, where the relevant rules did not provide for intervention. Gutschmidt clarifies the rule for the situation that matters most in practice: when intervention is available and the would-be challenger does not properly invoke it.
What This Means for Developers and Applicants
For permit applicants, Gutschmidt offers three practical reinforcements:
First, rigorous compliance with notice requirements pays off. Goodfellow’s case was strengthened considerably by its early and repeated outreach which involved two informational meetings with the homeowners association, the required mailed notice, and the published notice in The Maui News clearly identifying the intervention deadline. When opponents later claimed they did not have time to act, the record told a different story.
Second, document community outreach contemporaneously. The Commission’s good cause inquiry turned in part on what the would-be intervenors knew and when they knew it. Goodfellow’s representative was able to testify with specificity about the September 2022 Zoom meeting, the July 5, 2023 follow-up email, the property manager’s vacation timing, and the August 3, 2023 information session. That contemporaneous record made the Commission’s good cause analysis straightforward.
Third, procedural defenses can resolve cases without litigating the merits. The Appellants raised substantive challenges, including arguments about whether the project qualified as “mining and resource extraction” under the Maui County Code and whether the conditions imposed by the Commission were consistent with the application. None of those arguments was reached. By holding the line on the intervention deadline, the Commission, and ultimately the Supreme Court, ended the case before those issues required adjudication.
For project opponents, the message is equally clear: read the notice, calendar the deadline, and file on time. Showing up the day before the hearing with concerns is no substitute for participating in the process for which the agency’s rules provide.
Conclusion
Gutschmidt is a procedural case, but procedure is where land use disputes are often won and lost. By reaffirming that agencies have wide discretion to enforce intervention deadlines, declining to import a lenient civil litigation standard, and confirming that judicial review of the merits is unavailable to those who do not properly participate in the contested case, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court has provided applicants and agencies with a clear framework. For developers navigating Hawai‘i’s land use approval processes, that clarity is itself a benefit.


